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Taking the Rule of Law Seriously
Michele Cotton*
17 U. MASS. L. REV. 2
ABSTRACT
American legal scholars and jurists have given the rule of law their sustained
attention, and the international community has treated it as an important measure of
societal well-being. But still the rule of law is not taken seriously. For one thing,
little effort has been made to craft a definition of the rule of law that is actually
useful. And even when legal scholarship does try at empiricism that could illuminate
the vitality of our rule of law, it generally starts from the wrong hypotheses and uses
the wrong methods. It focuses on how to achieve “access to justice” and privileges
quantitative approaches and the supposed “gold standard” of the randomized
controlled trial over the qualitative assessment that is necessary to hold ourselves
accountable for the rule of law. However, it is nonetheless possible to derive a
workable, consensus definition of the rule of law from the varied and elaborate
concepts offered by legal scholars and jurists, which would provide a metric that
could be used as the basis for more directly relevant research. Further, some of the
research that has already been done about what goes on in our courtrooms does
suggest what work evaluating the extent to which we are achieving the rule of law
would look like. Such research must be done if we intend to ensure a fundamentally
important mechanism for achieving many of our most cherished values, including
equal treatment and social justice. We have to take the rule of law seriously if we
intend to uphold those values.
AUTHOR’S NOTE
*Associate Professor and Director, Legal Studies, University of Baltimore Yale
Gordon College of Arts and Sciences. J.D., New York University School of Law;
Ph.D., Brandeis University, Ed.M., Harvard Graduate School of Education.
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INTRODUCTION

I

t would seem that we are taking the rule of law seriously. When we
talk about our legal system and our society in general, we often
insist that it follows the “rule of law.”1 Further, American legal
scholars and jurists have given the rule of law their sustained
attention.2 The same applies to international legal scholars and
organizations, which largely at our behest have treated the rule of law
as an important measure of societal well-being. 3
But the rule of law is not, in fact, taken seriously. Legal scholars
and jurists have made little effort to work toward a definition of the
rule of law that is actually useful. In addition, legal scholarship and
research are nearly devoid of concern or consideration for whether our
system is actually ruled by law. Rather than being taken seriously, the
rule of law has been left an intellectual abstraction and a largely inert
piece of rhetoric.
This Article explores what would be involved in taking the rule of
law seriously.
First, as Part I of this Article explains, a common thread runs
through the varied definitions of the rule of law that have been offered
by legal scholars and jurists. That definitional core provides an
opportunity to establish a workable, consensus metric. Seeing the rule
of law as a basis for accountability is the first step toward taking it
seriously.
Second, as Part II indicates, legal scholarship presently lacks
concern for such practical matters as whether and to what extent we
have a properly functioning rule of law. Even when legal scholarship
does make an effort at empiricism, it privileges quantitative
1
2
3

See discussions infra Part, I.A, I.D.
See discussion infra Part I.
See e.g., Simon Chesterman, Vice Dean & Professor of L., Nat’l Univ. of Sing.;
Glob. Professor & Dir. of the N.Y.U. Sch. of L. Sing. Programme, Keynote
Address at United Nations Headquarters: Taking Stock: The U.N. Security
Council and the Rule of Law (Oct. 28, 2010) (transcript on file with the UMass
Law Review); Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, World Governance Indicators,
WORLD BANK, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (listing the rule of
law as one of six indicators used to assess governance). See also WORLD JUST.
PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2017-2018 at 3 (2019) (ranking the United States
nineteenth in the world in adherence to the rule of law). The World Justice
Project began as an initiative of the American Bar Association to “advance the
rule of law worldwide.” About Us, WORLD JUST. PROJECT,
https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/NDV2-MXE7].
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approaches that do not align with the distinctively qualitative
assessment necessary to hold ourselves accountable for the rule of law.
Taking the rule of law seriously requires us to be prepared to chart a
new research agenda and approach.
Finally, Part III describes what it would look like to take the rule of
law seriously. What little empirical work has been done on what goes
on in our courtrooms has thus far only incidentally evaluated our
adherence to the rule of law, rather than directly examining the extent
of its achievement. And it is concerning that even such indirect
examination indicates that we do need to be concerned about the
vitality of our rule of law. Fortunately, some of this research does
suggest what it would look like to take the rule of law seriously.
The rule of law is a fundamentally important mechanism that
facilitates the achievement of many of our most cherished values,
including equal treatment and social justice. We have to take the rule
of law seriously if we intend to uphold those values.
I. DEFINING THE RULE OF LAW SO THAT IT WILL BE USEFUL FOR
EVALUATION
Our legal scholarship and jurisprudence have not reached a clear
consensus of what is meant by the rule of law, which prevents it from
becoming a metric by which our legal system can be evaluated. 4
International legal scholars and organizations do try to treat the rule of
law as a measure of accountability, but they have identified a grab-bag
of good governance features as indicators of the rule of law rather than
a distinctive and coherent norm.5 In order to say whether we have the
rule of law in our system—and to evaluate its extent and what reforms
it needs—we need a workable definition.
Our current lack of such a definition does not result merely from
the fact that the rule of law is a “big concept.” Other concepts of
similar apparent amorphousness, like access to justice, democracy, and
4
5

See discussions infra Parts I.A to I.D.
See e.g., What is the Rule of Law?, WORLD JUST. PROJECT,
https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us/overview/what-rule-law
[https://perma.cc/LQG5-BDMS] (identifying accountability, just law, open
government, and accessible and impartial justice as “four universal principles
[that] constitute a working definition of the rule of law”); Kaufmann & Kraay,
supra note 3 (establishing voice and accountability, regulatory quality, political
stability and absence of violence/terrorism, rule of law, government
effectiveness, and control of corruption as the six “dimension for governance”).
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racial equality, have lately been subjected to real evaluation. 6 If the
rule of law is as important as we say, then we must find a way to
examine it with similar urgency and intentionality.
Thus far, legal scholars and jurists have produced a remarkably
murky conceptualization of the rule of law. It has often been lamented
how “essentially contested,”7 “deeply ambiguous,”8 and “vague and
imprecise”9 the concept of the rule of law is. Indeed, attempts to
formulate a definition would seem to be a hopeless endeavor if, as one
scholar has asserted, “the rule of law is best thought of as a
configuration of structures, social attitudes, and even traditions.”10
Broadly sweeping, multiplicitous, and widely ranging understandings
of the rule of law are not useful for the purposes of measurement,
comparison, and evaluation. If a definition cannot even be used to
identify the thing which it is a definition of, then the act of defining
has become a mere exercise.

6

7

8

9

10

See e.g., WORLD JUST. PROJECT, GLOBAL INSIGHTS ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE
(2019), https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-A2J2019.pdf (compiling information from 101 countries on access to justice and
creating national profiles); William Y. Chin, Racial Equality and Inequality in
America and Lessons from Other Countries, 27 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC.
JUST. 473 (2021) (analyzing how the United States can improve racial equality
by looking to practices implemented by other countries); Joshua Ulan Galperin,
Legitimacy, Legality, and the Life of Democracy, VT. L. REV. (2021) (examining
the role majoritarianism and individualist principles in a democracy); Glen
Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency
Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399 (2003) (arguing that the
myth of popular sovereignty in direct democracy should be rejected and that
ballot initiatives should be viewed as efforts made by “initiative proponents”
rather than the romanticized concept of “the people”).
Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in
Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137, 151, 153-54 (2002). See also Bernice Bouie
Donald, When the Rule of Law Breaks Down: Implications of the 1866 Memphis
Massacre for the Passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 1607,
1612 (2018) (“[M]any agree that the rule of law is an ‘essentially contested
concept.’”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (“[T]he precise
meaning of [the rule of law] may be less clear today than ever before.”).
Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 791
(1989).
Frank Lovett, A Positivist Account of the Rule of Law, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 41,
41 (2002).
Tom Ginsburg, Pitfalls of Measuring the Rule of Law, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE LAW
269, 272 (2011).
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But that does not have to be the case. Upon close examination,
many apparent differences between conceptualizations of the rule of
law are actually variations regarding its scope. Other apparent
differences seem more like attempts to bring other desiderata under the
attractive aegis of the rule of law rather than true inconsistencies.
Despite appearances, there appears to be a core understanding of what
the rule of law means, and that core understanding provides the basis
for a meaningful metric.

A. Simple Formulations
The most attractive formulation of the rule of law would seem to
be the simplest one because simpler metrics are more easily applied
than complicated ones. In addition, it is more likely that such a
formulation will identify what is most essential to the rule of law, as
opposed to additional—perhaps optional—features. Of course, the
problem is the risk of being inaccurate due to oversimplification or
truncation. But simple formulations are the best starting place for
determining a workable metric, which can then be evaluated for
accuracy and suitability.
Some of the simplest definitions of the rule of law are probably
those found on the United States citizenship test. Acceptable answers
for the meaning of the “rule of law” include: “[n]o one is above the
law,” “[e]veryone must follow the law,” “[l]eaders must obey the law,”
and “[g]overnment must obey the law.” 11 These statements are actually
somewhat different from each other. “No one is above the law”
emphasizes the idea that the law applies even to persons of the highest
status. “Everyone must follow the law” is more focused on the general
obedience of the citizenry to the law. “Government [and its leaders]
must obey the law” moves the emphasis, making government the most
important observer of the law. Although it could be a case of the blind
11

U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., CIVICS (HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT)
QUESTIONS FOR THE NATURALIZATION TEST 2 (2019), https://www.uscis.gov/sit
es/default/files/document/questions-and-answers/100q.pdf
[hereinafter 2008
NATURALIZATION TEST]. Note that the Trump administration published a new
naturalization test where the rule of law question appeared as number thirteen.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., M-1778, 128 CIVICS QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS (2020 VERSION) at 3 (2021), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/d
ocument/crc/M_1778.pdf. The 2020 revised naturalization civics test is no longer
administered to first-time test takers. USCIS Reverts to the 2008 Version of the
Naturalization Civics Test, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (Feb.
22 2021), https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-reverts-to-the-2008version-of-the-naturalization-civics-test [https://perma.cc/Q65P-M5YY].
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men with the elephant, these definitions are not consistent in their
focus on who is accountable for the rule of law or how it applies.
Judge Richard Posner also offers a simple definition of the rule of
law. According to him, the rule of law means that judges decide cases
“without respect of persons,” that is, indifferent to parties’ social status
or attractiveness.12 This version describes government’s application of
law as not only extending to all citizens regardless of status (as in “[n]o
one is above the law”), but also more explicitly as banishing the
consideration of parties from decision-making.
Another simple statement about what is meant by the rule of law
was communicated by Chief Justice John Marshall in his remark
(repeating John Adams) that our government is one “of laws, and not
of men.”13 This understanding of the meaning of the rule of law differs
somewhat from Posner’s definition. Marshall’s version makes clear
that judges should base their decisions on the law as stated and not on
anything extralegal; Posner’s only specifies that judges should
disregard who the parties are, leaving implicit what judges do regard in
making their decisions.
Some of these simple conceptions of the rule of law seem better
than others in capturing what the rule of law is. For example, it seems
doubtful that the rule of law has much to do with the general
obedience of the citizenry to the law (as in one of the acceptable
answers to the citizenship exam, “[e]veryone must follow the law”).14
Obedience of citizens does not actually seem to be the essence of the
rule of law, as there are some laws that many people fail to obey (like
speed limits, drug laws, and laws that are the objects of civil
disobedience), without there being any sense that the rule of law is
under attack. On the other hand, if judges applied the law with the
same regularity with which motorists obey speed limits, that would
presumably be viewed as a serious threat to the rule of law.
Even widespread, material disobedience on the part of citizens
would probably not be described as a breakdown in the rule of law as
12

13
14

Dafna Linzer, How I Passed My U.S. Citizenship Test: By Keeping the Right
Answers to Myself, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 23, 2011, 5:31 PM), https://www.propubli
ca.org/article/how-i-passed-my-us-citizenship-test-by-keeping-the-rightanswers-to-myself [https://perma.cc/F95E-3BT4].
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
2008 NATURALIZATION TEST, supra note 11. Some other sources, particularly
those that do international comparisons, do consider the “likelihood of crime and
violence” as one of the measures of whether a society can be said to have the
rule of law. See also sources cites supra note 3.
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such, but rather a more fundamental social collapse—a breakdown of
law itself. A breakdown in the rule of law instead comes when the
government fails to follow the law in running the society, and it is at
this point we say that the rule of law is in jeopardy. Indeed, the citizens
of a totalitarian society might be very obedient to the law, but that is
not enough to say that such societies have the rule of law.15
It is perhaps for this reason that other acceptable answers to the
question about the rule of law on the U.S. citizenship test put the
emphasis on government actors as the ones who must be accountable
for the rule of law (“[l]eaders must obey the law” or “[g]overnment
must obey the law”).16 That is what seems to get more at the essence of
the rule of law, which is primarily something that binds governmental
decision-makers, as opposed to puts responsibilities on citizens. 17
Posner’s version of the rule of law, though evidently more precise
and more accurate than some of the citizenship test’s stylings, may still
not be the best formulation. He says that the rule of law amounts to
making decisions without partiality toward the parties.18 It might well
be understood by Posner that what is being impartially applied is the
law, rather than some other criterion of decision. However, by
stressing impartiality, this description seems like the tail wagging the
dog. If a judge is applying the law—and no other criterion—then the
result will necessarily be an impartial adjudication, as other criteria do
not enter into the decision-making process. Impartiality, then, is a
consequence of applying the law rather than a feature of the rule of
law itself.
These conceptions of the rule of law are inconsistent with each
other in minor respects. But it would not be difficult to imagine the
proponents of these formulations agreeing with Marshall’s sense of it
as government decision-making that applies laws strictly according to
their terms and does not employ any extra-legal preferences of those
making the decisions—thereby qualifying as government “of laws, and

15

16
17

18

See Arthur L. Goodhart, The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty, 106 U. PA.
L. Rev. 943, 947 (1958) (distinguishing between the rule of law and the “rule by
law” seen in totalitarian countries).
2008 NATURALIZATION TEST, supra note 11.
Interestingly, the answers on the citizenship test speak of the government and
the leaders as “obeying” the law, and everyone as “following” the law. Id. But
strictly speaking it is citizens who are obedient to law and government actors
that follow the law in their decision-making with respect to citizens.
See Linzer, supra note 12.
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not of men.”19 This basic understanding is apparently shared across
definitions, subject mainly to variations in emphasis or focus, and so
would amount to a consensus view of what the rule of law means and
appears to be accurate as far as it goes. Thus, this definition could be
used as a workable metric by which to evaluate whether our system
actually abides by the rule of law.

B. More Complex Formulations
It is true that many definitions of the rule of law prescribe
additional features, suggesting that the simplest definition is
incomplete, and thus inaccurate. For example, Lon Fuller describes
eight “elements” associated with the rule of law: generality, publicity,
prospectivity, clarity, noncontradictoriness, capability of being
followed, stability, and congruence between norms as stated and norms
as applied.20 Most of these elements—the first seven—might be said to
represent the “legislative” aspect of the rule of law. They are not
features of the rule of law as such but what the law ought to have in
order for its rule to be legitimate. The implicit idea in Fuller’s
description is that law is something that is intended to affect the
behavior of citizens, and that it must be public, clear, etc., in order for
it to have a chance of actually having such an effect. 21 Otherwise, the
law acts more like a tripwire for the unfortunate persons who do not
know about its existence or understand what it prohibits. It would not
be fair or reasonable (except perhaps in a Kafkaesque world) to hold a
person responsible for failing to obey a secret or incomprehensible
law.
The eighth element in Fuller’s list—congruence between norms as
stated and norms as applied—addresses the rule of law as such, how a
law that meets the other (legislative) criteria is to be enforced. Where
congruence between norms as stated and norms as applied is lacking,
even laws that meet the other criteria on the list would in effect be
merely ceremonial or sham. (A law that is not actually enforced is

19
20

21

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
Fallon, supra note 7, at 8 n.27 (“[Fallon’s list] differs in detail from, but is in
spirit consistent with, Lon Fuller’s account of eight criteria that must be satisfied
for law to exist . . . .”). See also LON J. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39
(1964).
See FULLER, supra note 20.

2021

Taking the Rule of Law Seriously

11

probably better described as a bit of propaganda or rhetoric than as
“law”.22)
While all of Fuller’s elements might be essential to the rule of law,
the seven legislative requirements are more readily assessed than the
adjudicative criterion of congruence. There can be disputes over how
public and how clear the law actually is, but if the words of the law
can be obtained by most citizens and understood by them to a
meaningful extent, then we can say that the society has those elements
of Fuller’s list. However, the eighth element, congruence between the
norms as stated and norms as applied, is not as readily assessed.
Indeed, it is not uncommon for societies to have laws that “sound good
on paper”—that are public, clear, etc.—but that are not actually
enforced as written. It may, moreover, take substantial investigation to
document the failure of the words on paper to carry over into the
everyday and granular business of government decision-making.
Accordingly, it could be said that this aspect of the rule of law is
particularly important as a metric.
Further, Fuller’s list does not amount to a different description of
the rule of law so much as an elaboration on what constitutes the law
that the rule of law is promoting. The eighth of those elements, that the
norms as stated are the norms as applied, is much the same in
substance as the idea embodied in the simple procedural definition of
the rule of law. Both are concerned with applying laws according to
their terms and not using extra-legal considerations—government of

22

See, e.g., Victoria Schwartz, The Influences of the West on the 1993 Russian
Constitution, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 101, 144-45 (2009)
(explaining that although the Russian Bill of Rights has been described as
similar to the bill of rights in the U.S. Constitution, many of those rights “cannot
be enforced by the court system” and therefore remain rhetorical); Kathryn
Hendley, Varieties of Legal Dualism: Making Sense of the Role of Law in
Contemporary Russia, 29 WIS. INT’L L.J. 233 (2011) (describing the dualism of
the Russian government, which has lead to the inconsistent application of the
law to citizens); Haiting Zhang, Traditional Culture v. Westernization: On the
Road Toward the Rule of Law in China, 25 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 355, 387
(2011) (describing how supporters of Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist Party
in Taiwan argued that the Constitution existed simply “for reference”); Randle
C. DeFalco, The Uncertain Relationship Between International Criminal Law
Accountability and the Rule of Law in Post-Atrocity States: Lessons from
Cambodia, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 16 (2018) (detailing how Cambodia,
which claims to be committed to “rule of law-based governance” ignores the law
when “inconvenient”).
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laws and not of men.23 Thus, this understanding of the rule of law is
also not inconsistent with that definition.

C. Substantive Elements
Other jurists and legal scholars have proposed additional criteria
for the rule of law that, if essential, would indicate that the simple
understanding of the rule of law is inadequate. For example, Justice
Kennedy has said that the rule of law “must respect and preserve the
dignity, equality, and human rights of all persons.”24 This
conceptualization invokes a more substantive conception rather than
the purely procedural understanding of the concept of the rule of law
that is embodied in the simple procedural definition.
It is true that in calling for the rule of law to show respect for
“dignity,” Kennedy could in fact be describing a procedural norm: a
system that does not, say, harass or demean the parties to a case. Such
a procedural norm is implicitly necessary to the rule of law, insofar as
litigants would be impeded from availing themselves of a system that
is routinely abusive of them. Or Kennedy might be calling for
something more than that, for substantive law that does not treat
persons in primarily instrumental ways. “Equality” presents a similar
uncertainty as a criterion. It could refer procedurally to a system that
treats all citizens the same, regardless of who they are (as in Posner’s
definition).25 Or it might mean substantively a system of laws that
prohibits discrimination based on race and certain other characteristics.
But Kennedy’s particular reference to “human rights” confirms that he
does view the rule of law as not only involving procedural norms but
also substantive ones.26
Indeed, other conceptions of the rule of law also suppose that
substantive guarantees of human rights constitute an essential feature
of it. For example, the Secretary General of the United Nations has
defined the rule of law as involving accountability to “laws that are . . .
consistent with international human rights norms and standards.” 27 The
23
24

25
26
27

Linzer, supra note 12.
Robert Stein, Rule of Law: What Does it Mean?, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 293, 299
(2009).
Linzer, supra note 12.
Stein, supra note 24.
The rule of law is defined as a:
principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally
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American federal court system has similarly included in its own
definition of the rule of law that it be “consistent with international
human rights principles.”28
Such substantive expectations for the rule of law represent an
expansion of the simpler procedural definition, and, moreover, make
for an unwieldy metric. Evaluation of whether the substance of law
complies with human rights—for example, whether a law permitting
abortion denies substantive equality or protects it—can be contested
from society to society and even within a society. Determining whether
a society’s laws as written are the same as the laws as enforced is more
objectively assessable (though this analysis may still give rise to
disputes over certain details).
Despite its limits, we may still be inclined to accept the limited
procedural concept of the rule of law because if such substantive
equality were a required feature, then we would have to say we have
not had the rule of law for most of the history of this country (and
may not even have it now). While there may be disagreement about
what human rights are, the rule of law as a procedural mechanism
presently represents a more attainable standard. In addition, defining
the rule of law in its most modest procedural sense is an important
benchmark in another way: if our system falls short of achieving even
this minimalist rule of law, then that is a disturbing fact worth
confronting. It is important to note, moreover, that the more
substantive understanding of the rule of law is not a rejection of the
idea that it must also mean that the norms as stated are the norms as

28

enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are
consistent with international human rights norms and
standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to
the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law,
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law,
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal
certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal
transparency.
U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict
and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616, (Aug. 23, 2004),
https://undocs.org/S/2004/616.
See Overview–Rule of Law, U.S. CTS. (2021), https://www.uscourts.gov/educationalresources/educational-activities/overview-rule-law
[https://perma.cc/KQ7QKUPA] (“[the rule of law is] a principle under which all persons, institutions,
and entities are accountable to laws that are: publicly promulgated, equally
enforced, independently adjudicated, and consistent with international human
rights principles.”).
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applied—for unless that is true the proposed substantive elements have
no mechanism for enforcement.

D. Structural Features
There are also governmental structures that have been posited as
essential to the rule of law, that may add details to what the rule of law
means. For example, Justice Kennedy proposed that to have the rule of
law, we “must establish and safeguard the constitutional structures
necessary to build a free society in which all citizens have a
meaningful voice in shaping and enacting the rules that govern
them.”29 Similarly, Justice O’Connor described the “separation of the
legislative and judicial powers of government” as “essential” to the
rule of law, and an independent judiciary as “the foundation that
underlies and supports” it.30 In addition, the World Justice Project has
proposed that the rule of law is measured in part by “the extent to
which, in practice, those who govern are bound by governmental and
non-governmental checks such as an independent judiciary, a free
press, the ability of legislatures to provide oversight, and more.” 31
The governmental structures commonly identified as crucial to the
rule of law—constitution, democratic participation, separation of
powers, free press, and independent judiciary—may well be conducive
to its development, maintenance, and application. But in defining the
rule of law, it is important to distinguish between facilitative structures
and necessary features.
There are many jurisdictions in our country that lack an
independent judiciary, if by independent one means that the judges
must not be subject to the control of the electorate. 32 Yet, it is not
assumed that such jurisdictions lack the rule of law. Also, it is not
clear that we have even attained the kind of democratic participation
that gives citizens “a meaningful voice in shaping and enacting the
laws that govern them,”33 since votes count differently in value from
29
30

31

32

33

Stein, supra note 24, at 299-300.
Sandra Day O’Connor, Vindicating the Rule of Law: The Role of the Judiciary,
2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 1, 2-3 (2003).
Press Release, World Justice Project, World Justice Project Rule of Law Index
2019 (Feb. 27, 2019) (on file with UMass Law Review).
See Judicial Selection: Significant Figures, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/judicial-selectionsignificant-figures [https://perma.cc/6AYX-UZ8T] (last updated May 8, 2021)
(stating that thirty-nine states elect judges at some level).
Stein, supra note 24, at 299-300.
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jurisdiction to jurisdiction and do not count at all in a few places. But
it is not supposed that that prevents the application of the rule of law
by the courts of those jurisdictions.
Certain structures may in fact be necessary to—not merely
facilitative of—the rule of law. Exactly what those structures are
presents a separate issue and subject for research. Their relationship to
the rule of law is uncertain enough that they should not be considered
necessary to the rule of law as a metric. Because it can be established
directly whether the rule of law is operating in a society, it need not be
ascertained whether certain structures are in place for it to be said that
the society has a functioning rule of law, and the presence of such
structures do not guarantee that it does have a functioning rule of law.

E. Due Process, Appellate Review, and the Rule of Law
If the rule of law is most helpfully defined as a procedural norm (as
the simplest definition of the rule of law would have it), then it might
be argued that it is already manifest that our system has the rule of
law. Indeed, it might appear that a system has the rule of law as long as
it provides due process and engages in appellate review of its decisionmaking. Due process indeed provides a propitious environment for
adherence to the rule of law, and appellate review corrects
misapplication of the law (ensuring that the norms as stated are the
norms as applied, at least ultimately). Thus, it might seem that we do
not need any deeper evaluation of our system to determine the extent
to which it has the rule of law, because these features of the system
theoretically ensure that it does.
No matter how beneficial these features are for the rule of law, they
do not amount to the rule of law as such or ensure that it functions
effectively. Due process, as the Supreme Court has defined it, involves
the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.”34 What constitutes a “meaningful manner” is subject to
interpretation, but it is primarily about ensuring that the court or other
forum receives and pays attention to the relevant evidence rather than
subjects it to any particular form of consideration.35 A hearing that
34

35

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). See also Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914) (“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to
be heard.”).
Accordingly, a defendant must have a “meaningful opportunity to defend”
against the charge against him. See Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237,
243 (2016) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1979). The
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satisfies due process requirements does not ensure the rule of law,
insofar as it does not ensure an outcome that accords with the law.
Rather, it helps ensure that the parties have the ability to supply the
facts to which the court, in theory, applies the law.36
Indeed, appellate review in general—rather than due process
review in particular—is what is expected to ensure compliance with
the law. However, appellate review as presently constituted is an
inadequate means of ensuring the rule of law. For one thing, the right
of appeal is not guaranteed to litigants, and review at the highest level
is generally discretionary.37 Accordingly, the opportunity of correction
that appeal offers is contingent. In addition, many obstacles, including
high cost, prevent parties, especially those of limited means, from
appealing.38 Further, the correct application of the law at the appellate

36

37

38

opportunity to defend includes being able to present “competent, reliable
evidence” for consideration. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). This
also applies in civil cases, where parties must be able to present relevant
evidence and the court “must listen” to what the parties have to say. See Little v.
Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16 (1981); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
These norms of receiving evidence and considering it provide the context for
decision-making, but due process does not compel any particular mode of
evaluating evidence.
Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 243 (explaining that when reviewing the sufficiency of
evidence, courts have a duty to conduct a “limited inquiry” to ensure that at least
the minimum due process requirements have been provided).
See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966) (“[The Supreme] Court
has never held that the States are required to establish avenues of appellate
review . . . .”); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) (“[D]ue process does
not independently require that the State provide a right to appeal.”); Halbert v.
Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005) (“The Federal Constitution imposes on the
States no obligation to provide appellate review of criminal convictions.”) (citing
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894)).
For example, it is common for an appeal bond to be required. See, e.g., MD.
CODE, ANN. REAL PROP. § 8-401(h)(2) (West 2019) (“The tenant, in order to
stay any execution of the judgment, shall give a bond to the landlord . . . and
answer to the landlord in all costs and damages mentioned in the judgment, and
other damages as shall be incurred and sustained by reason of the appeal.”). In
addition, other obstacles may be placed in front of appeals, such as a very short
window of opportunity. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP.§ 8-401(h)(1)
(West 2019) (“The tenant or the landlord may appeal from the judgment of the
District Court to the circuit court for any county at any time within 4 days from
the rendition of the judgment.”). Moreover, limitations may be placed on when a
record appeal can be sought. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12401(f) (West 2013) (“In a civil case in which the amount in controversy exceeds
$5,000 exclusive of interest, costs, and attorney’s fees . . . an appeal shall be
heard on the record made in the District Court. In every other case . . . an appeal
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level, if it occurs, is much delayed, which may, through attrition and
collateral damage, reduce the impact of any ultimate correction.
Perhaps most importantly, appellate review is not an ideal means of
ensuring the rule of law because it does not provide it in the first
instance. It only redresses a portion—probably a very small portion—
of the cases where the norms as stated are not the norms as applied,
and thus is a stopgap rather than a means of enacting the rule of law.
And, finally, when appellate courts review trial courts, they do so
under a deferential standard that is willing to overlook, to some extent,
the failure of the application of norms as stated, reducing the value of
appeal as a guarantor of the rule of law.39
To ensure that we have a functioning rule of law, it is not enough
to point to these features of our system. In fact, the minimalist
interpretation of due process that prevails and the limited access to
appellate review that exists are reasons to be concerned about the wellbeing of our rule of law. To know the extent to which the rule of law
functions in this country, we must apply the metric of what constitutes
the rule of law to its enactment—in our trial courts rather than the
appellate courts—to see if they are in fact ruled by law.

F. The Rule of Law as a Metric
For whatever reason, legal scholars and jurists have produced
varied disquisitions upon the rule of law. The unwieldy academic
enterprise of defining the rule of law may be well-intentioned and has
no doubt proved revealing in many respects. However, it has not led to
the vitally important development of a generally useful definition of
the rule of law, one that represents a shared understanding and that can
serve as means of identifying and evaluating the achievement of the
rule of law.
Scholars and jurists do apparently agree that on its most
fundamental level the rule of law means that the norms as stated are

39

shall be tried de novo.”). A de novo appeal essentially prevents the review of
whether any errors were made by the trial court; the circuit court trying the case
de novo “receive[s] evidence and make[s] determinations of facts as though no
prior proceeding had occurred . . . .” In re Marcus J., 950 A.2d 787, 795 (Md.
2008).
See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694-95 (1984) (“[In
conducting its review] a court should presume . . . that the judge or jury acted
according to law . . . . The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the
assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and
impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.”).
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the norms as applied.40 It is true that there are differences of
perspective on the scope of the rule of law and other details, but this
core idea is a constant. This core idea is also capable of being used as a
metric to evaluate the legal system. If the system fails to adhere to this
core understanding, then it should be said that it does not have the rule
of law. As the existence of the other proposed features of the rule of
law suggests, it might still be argued that even where the norms as
stated are the norms as applied, that is not enough by itself to
demonstrate that the rule of law prevails. But it seems safe to say that a
system that does not meet at least this criterion does not have the rule
of law.
II. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
(IMPEDIMENTS TO TAKING THE RULE OF LAW SERIOUSLY)
One of the current impediments to taking the rule of law seriously
is a scholarly environment that is manifestly inhospitable to the
relevant research. For instance, the legal academy currently focuses on
the theoretical rather than the practical, discouraging the study of the
real-life operation of the legal system that would be necessary to
determine the vitality of our rule of law.41 Further, even the rare
relevant empirical work that is done about our courts tends to be
focused on supporting a particular objective—such as a right to
counsel for civil litigants—that may well represent a case of the
conclusion driving the evidence rather than the evidence driving the
conclusion.42 Indeed, the type of study needed to evaluate the efficacy
of our rule of law would be difficult to accommodate right now
because it appears that the only empirical legal scholarship considered
to be credible is that which is rigidly quantitative in nature, and is thus
inherently inadequate to the task.43 Taking the rule of law seriously
will require a reorientation in legal scholarship.
A. Legal Scholarship and Its Focus on the Impractical
Empirical study of our legal system, of the kind necessary to
evaluate how well it adheres to the rule of law, is uncommon. The
norm in legal scholarship is more theoretical and philosophical as
40
41
42
43

See sources cited supra note 20.
See discussion infra Part II-A.
See discussion infra Part II-B.
See discussion infra Part II-C.
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opposed to empirical. It is seldom concerned with the operation and
efficacy of our courts and how the law works in practice. More than a
few scholars and jurists have expressed dismay over this current state
of affairs.
For example, Judge Harry T. Edwards has argued that legal
scholars should be “producing scholarship that judges, legislators, and
practitioners can use,” but have instead been “emphasizing abstract
theory at the expense of [such] practical scholarship.” 44 In his view,
[t]here has been a clear decline in the volume of “practical”
scholarship published by law professors. “Practical” legal
scholarship, in the broadest sense . . . is prescriptive: it analyzes
the law and the legal system with an aim to instruct attorneys in
their consideration of legal problems; to guide judges and other
decisionmakers in their resolution of legal disputes; and to advise
legislators and other policymakers on law reform.45

Professor Robert W. Gordon has similarly bemoaned the “useless
blather” of much legal scholarship, and has called for “more empirical
work, institutional description, and law-in-action studies” and more
attention to “describing how some court, agency, enforcement process,
or legal transaction actually works.”46
Similarly, Judge Richard A. Posner has observed that legal
scholarship was at one time “oriented toward reform and hence sought
its primary audience among those people—mainly legal professionals,
including other law professors, judges, legislators, and practicing
lawyers—who were interested in improving law and legal
institutions.”47 And its future, as he saw it, is threatened unless
scholars return to doing more to “influence practice, rather than merely
to circulat[ing] their ideas within the sealed network of a purely
academic discourse.”48 Further, Professor Deborah L. Rhode has
complained that
much conventional [legal] scholarship is out of touch with
fundamental social problems. Too many debates in leading law
reviews are excessively insular and self-referential. When
44

45
46

47

48

Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L.REV. 34, 34 (1992).
Id. at 42-43.
Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the “Middle Ground”, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 2075, 2076, 2087 (1993).
Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1314
(2001).
Id. at 1317.
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professors write mainly for each other, they face little pressure to
address the problems that practitioners or the public find most
urgent or to identify solutions that have some realistic chance of
adoption.49

It should be noted that, even to the extent that legal scholars
concern themselves with practical aspects of law, they tend to focus on
the appellate courts rather than the trial courts.50 While the legal
impact of appellate courts is obviously greater because of their role in
establishing precedent, they are also highly unrepresentative. Trial
courts address the greater number of legal cases by far, and have a
more direct impact on people’s lives.51 If the rule of law in this country
can be said to be working well, then it must work well in the trial
courts where the vast majority of citizens experience whatever form of
it the legal system offers.
The repeated refrain among critics is a call for more scholarship on
the operation of the legal system. These critics believe legal scholars
ought to be more concerned with “analyz[ing] the law and the legal
system with the aim to instruct attorneys . . . [and] guide judges,” 52 and
should give more consideration to “law-in-action studies” and with
49
50

51

52

Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1342 (2002).
See, e.g., Binny Miller, Visibility and Accountability: Shining a Light on
Proceedings in Misdemeanor Two-Tier Court Systems, 63 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J.
191, 202 (2019) (“Appellate opinions are the bread and butter of much legal
scholarship.”); Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and
Improving the Navigation of The Yellow Submarine, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1161, 1163
(2006) (“[M]ost legal scholarship, focuses on the very top courts with an
occasional glance at the intermediate appellate courts . . . .”); Anna E. Carpenter
et al., Studying the “New” Civil Judges, WIS. L. REV. 249, 268 (2018) (“When
legal scholars speak about the civil justice system, they most often speak about
the federal system and appellate courts, whether they note this explicitly or not.
Legal scholars have examined the work of lower civil court judges in only a
relatively minuscule number of published studies.”) (footnote omitted).
In any given year, just one type of civil case filed in a single city has the
potential to substantially exceed civil appeals of all kinds filed in all the federal
circuit courts in the entire country. For example, the Baltimore City District
Court alone saw 144,058 landlord-tenant cases filed in fiscal year 2017 (July
2016-June 2017), while all of the circuit courts for the entire federal system
handled 28,071 civil appeals in total from April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017.
Compare Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2017 at 1, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fjcs_b7_0331.2017.pdf,
with
Landlord-tenant case filings from July 1, 2016 to June 30, 2017 at 2, MD ST.
CT., https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/import/district/statistics/20
17/fy2017.pdf.
Edwards, supra note 44, at 42-43.
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“describing how some court . . . [or] enforcement process . . . actually
works.”53 Such research should also be more dedicated to “law
reform,”54 “influenc[ing] practice,”55 and addressing “fundamental
social problems.”56
That is not to say that all critics of the state of legal scholarship, or
even these particularly prominent critics, see no value in the theoretical
and innovative work that has become the norm. Rather, their concerns
are more about proportion and impact. Too little legal scholarship has
practical significance. In this environment of disinterest, where lower
cachet is attached to scholarship concerned with practice, the project
of evaluating the vitality of our rule of law faces an uphill battle.

B. The Wrong Emphasis in Existing Empirical Work on the
Courts
The scant empirical work that exists on the operation of our courts
has not been conceived as being about the rule of law. Rather, it has
focused on “access to justice” and tends to conclude that whatever
problems the legal system might have can be solved by ensuring
greater availability of lawyers. However, it does not necessarily follow
that civil litigants, who are mostly unrepresented, are getting
unexpectedly bad results because of a lack of lawyers. It may mean
that there are shortcomings in our system’s adherence to the rule of
law. The orientation of empirical research toward preconceived
outcomes reflects that we are not taking the rule of law seriously, and
it also bodes ill for efforts to do so.
It has been said that we are experiencing a “crisis” in access to
justice.57 Thirty-eight states have established Access to Justice
Commissions;58 Access to Justice Departments are now part of various
53
54
55

56

57

58

Gordon, supra note 46, at 2087.
Edwards, supra note 44, at 43.
Posner, supra note 47, at 1317 (the quality of legal scholarship would improve if
practitioners chose to “influence practice, rather than merely circulate their ideas
within the sealed network of a purely academic discourse.”).
Rhode, supra note 49, at 1342 (“[M]uch conventional scholarship is out of touch
with fundamental social problems.”).
See
Access
to
Justice,
U.S.
DEP’T
JUST.
ARCHIVES,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atj [https://perma.cc/X8B8-VZGW].
MARY LAVERY FLYNN, AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., ACCESS TO JUST. COMM’NS:
INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH ADEQUATE STAFFING AND FUNDING 24
(2018), https://legalaidresearchnlada.files.wordpress.com/2020/01/ls_sclaid_atj_
commission_report-1.pdf.
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state courts;59 the American Bar Association has set up a Resource
Center for Access to Justice Initiatives;60 and a National Center for
Access to Justice tracks and supports such activities throughout the
country.61 These efforts are organized around a common theme, that
civil litigants are not getting the justice they deserve because of the
shortage of legal representation.
It is true that there are grounds for suspecting that such a problem
exists. Litigants in civil cases have no entitlement to a lawyer, as they
do in criminal cases.62 Funding for free attorneys for those who cannot
afford counsel has never been robust and has steadily declined over the
last few decades.63 Pro bono efforts are meager and do not come close
59

60

61

62

63

See e.g., Access to Justice Department, MD ADMIN. OFF. COURTS,
https://www.courts.state.md.us/accesstojustice [https://perma.cc/Z69E-VLYH],
New
York
State
Access
to
Justice
Program,
NY
CTS.,
www.nycourts.gov/ip/nya2j/ [https://perma.cc/SK69-X3VH]; Maine Justice
Action Group, ME JUST. FOUND., https://justicemaine.org/grants-andprograms/justice-action-group/ [https://perma.cc/6NJK-WYWR].
Resource Center for Access to Justice Initiatives, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defense/resource_cente
r_for_access_to_justice/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2021).
Justice Index, NAT’L CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUST., https://ncaj.org/staterankings/2021/justice-index [https://perma.cc/U9GX-TPE7].
See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441 (2011) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment
grants and indigent defendant the right to state-appointed counsel in a criminal
case . . . . But the Sixth Amendment does not govern civil cases.”); Lassiter v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (“[A]n indigent’s right to appointed
counsel . . . has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his
physical liberty if he loses the litigation.”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
344-345 (1963) (ruling that an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to be
represented by counsel).
In constant 2012 dollars, funding for the Legal Services Corporation declined
from a high of $836 million in 1980 to $348 million in 2012, the lowest level of
funding in its history. LIBBY PEARL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34016, LEGAL
SERVICES CORPORATION: BACKGROUND AND FUNDING 6 tbl.1 (2013),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20161221_RL34016_561359d0831cd45b
d0fadb404efe4a9267347be9.pdf. At the same time, funding provided by interest
on lawyers’ trust accounts (IOLTA), which has been used to fund lawyers for
the poor, has trended downward, from $371 million in 2007 to $93.2 million in
2011. Terry Carter, IOLTA Programs Find New Funding to Support Legal
Services, ABA J., (Mar. 1, 2013, 7:29 AM CST), http://www.abajournal.com/ma
gazine/article/iolta_programs_find_new_funding_to_support_legal_services/
[https://perma.cc/EB9F-Q5GD]. See also I. Glenn Cohen, Rationing Legal
Services, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 221, 221-22 (2013) (describing cuts to Legal
Services Corporation funding as well as reductions in other sources of funding
for legal services to the poor).
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to filling the gapbetween demand and supply, and mandatory pro bono
has not been adopted in any state. Even where litigants have assistance
from lawyers, it may well be in the temporary and superficial form of
help from a “lawyer for the day” at the courthouse or just legal advice
from an attorney who does not even enter the courtroom.64
In addition, civil litigants often lack the means and motivation to
hire legal counsel. The cost of an attorney is beyond what many of
them can afford.65 In any event, a tenant who allegedly owes two
months’ rent or a defendant who is sued for a few thousand dollars in
credit card debt could hardly be expected to spend an amount of
money to litigate the case that would exceed the amount being sued
for. Even in cases where the stakes are higher and more worthy of
personal expenditure, civil litigants might believe that a lawyer could
not do much to help them.66 Lack of familiarity with the advantages of
legal representation and with how the law works may actually make
those with the most to lose the least aware of the risk they are running
by not having counsel. Most civil litigants have little real
understanding of the substantive law or how the legal process works,
and therefore run a real risk of inadvertently failing to assert their legal
rights.67 Although they do not face the threat to liberty of a criminal
64

65

66

67

D. James Greiner & Cassandra W. Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal
Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use)
Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2127 (2012).
It appears that the cost of legal help has increased faster than the rate of
inflation. For example, the Laffey Matrix, one commonly used measure of
average hourly rates, indicates that in 1994-95 the hourly rate of an attorney with
one to three years of experience was $151 and in 2019-20 was $372. Laffey
Matrix, http://www.laffeymatrix.com/see.html [https://perma.cc/68UG-VYCW].
$151 would be only $256 in 2020, not $372. US INFLATION CALCULATOR,
https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ [https://perma.cc/9HGB-E8QV].
Drew A. Swank, Note, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 378
(2005).
See, e.g., Michele Cotton, A Case Study on Access to Justice and How to
Improve It, 62 J.L. SOCIETY 61 (2014) (explaining how unrepresented tenants in
rent escrow lawsuits are barred from seeking assistance from non-lawyers,
which puts them at a disadvantage compared to unrepresented landlords)
[hereinafter Case Study on Access to Justice]; Michele Cotton, When Judges
Don’t Follow the Law: Research and Recommendations, 19 CUNY L. REV. 57,
83-84 (2015) (explaining how pro se tenants in Baltimore City District Courts
are disadvantaged by their lack of familiarity with the court system) [hereinafter
Judges]; Nicole Summers, The Limits of Good Law: A Study of Housing Court
Outcomes, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 145 (2020) (arguing that data suggests the rule of
law does not ultimately assist represented tenants).
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prosecution, the outcomes of their cases are nonetheless likely to have
substantial effects on their finances, homes, and families.
It has been said that about eighty percent of civil litigants do not
have lawyers representing them when they go to court.68 Anyone who
visits the typical civil court—where landlord-tenant, debt collection,
and other relatively low-amount-in-controversy cases take place—can
see for themselves the hordes of unrepresented litigants congregating
there. This state of affairs has raised real questions for legal scholars
about whether our system is producing “fair and just outcomes for all
parties, including those facing financial and other disadvantages.” 69 It
is not surprising that lawyers would look at this situation of civil
litigants struggling alone with their legal cases and conclude that the
solution is the interjection of more free lawyers, and for legal scholars
to conclude that research empirically demonstrating the benefit of legal
representation is the most valuable use of their time and effort.
In addition, the constitutional right to counsel that applies in the
criminal justice system offers a seductive analogy that has led many
legal scholars to dedicate their efforts to achieving a similar benefit for
civil litigants. The Supreme Court’s explanation in its Gideon decision
of why counsel is mandated in criminal cases would seem to apply to
in many respects to civil cases as well.
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is
good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because
he does not know how to establish his innocence.70

Although consequences may generally be less dire in civil cases
than in criminal cases, the rationale for a right to legal representation is
68

69
70

Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47
CONN. L. REV. 741, 749 n.23 (2015).
See Access to Justice, supra note 57.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-345 (1963) (quoting Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
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much the same: the legal system is inscrutable or nearly so to
laypersons, which can inadvertently cause them to fail to assert their
legal rights. This logic is sufficiently compelling that a whole
movement has grown up around achieving “civil Gideon.”71
While there is a basis for the particular direction empirical legal
scholarship has taken, its orientation may also stem from ordinary
cognitive biases. As Daniel Kahneman has pointed out, it is normal for
people facing a difficult question to substitute one that is easier to
answer, without even realizing that that is what they have done. 72 It is
easier to answer the question of what would create more access to
justice, than to answer the question of how to ensure more justice, as
in ensuring that the rule of law governs the determinations that are
made. The tendency toward answering the easier question in this
situation is exacerbated by the “availability heuristic.”73 Lawyers see
more lawyering as the solution to the problem of injustice because
their usual way of addressing legal problems is through lawyering. The
dynamic might be captured by the saying that “to a person with a
hammer, every problem is a nail.” Of course, it is not necessarily the
case that scholars are wrong that the answer is more lawyers and more
lawyering. But the risk of mistake about the nature of the problem (and
accordingly the solution) naturally arises where such biases are

71

72
73

See Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face Losing Their Homes in Legal
Proceedings Must Have a Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y &
ETHICS J. 699, 728 (2006) (“[Numerous theories have been used] to argue for an
indigent civil litigant’s right to court-appointed counsel.”); Raymond H. Brescia,
Sheltering Counsel: Towards a Right to a Lawyer in Evictions Proceedings, 25
TOURO L. REV. 187, 210-23 (2009) (summarizing how the argument that the
right to free counsel should be granted for civil cases stemmed from Gideon and
then continued to gain popularity). See also Michael Millemann, Mandatory Pro
Bono in Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV.
18, 46-48 (1990) (recommending that the Court of Appeals issue a rule requiring
private attorneys to represent the poor). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
over many terms declined to find such a right to counsel in civil cases. See
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Turner v. Rogers, 564
U.S. 431 (2011). State-level efforts have been similarly unsuccessful. See Frase
v. Barnhart, 840 A.2d 114 (Md. 2003); King v. King, 174 P.3d 659 (Wash.
2007); In the Matter of the Petition to Establish a Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases, 85 WIS. LAW. 36, 49 (2012) (Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s denial of a
petition to establish right to counsel in civil cases).
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 97-98, 129-130 (1st ed. 2011).
Id. at 129-30.
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triggered, and the failure to examine other possibilities increases the
likelihood that such a mistake will indeed occur.
In addition, while access to justice research has a plausible basis, it
has nonetheless made two big assumptions: first, that there is indeed a
problem with civil litigants getting justice from the legal system, and
second, that the solution to the problem (if it exists) is more lawyering.
We still need to know the nature and extent of the civil litigants’
problems with the legal system. And it is not obvious that any
problems are the result of insufficient lawyering and can be resolved
by civil Gideon. Justice should presumably be something that courts
provide to all parties, irrespective of whether attorneys are present to
demand it. In an ideal universe, legal representation would not even be
important to the achievement of justice. Rather, the judge would elicit
the facts relevant to the elements of the cause(s) of action, as well as
any defenses, and then apply the law to the facts to produce the
outcome to which the parties are legally entitled. Indeed, the advocacy
of counsel could distract or sway the judge away from decisionmaking based on the law.
Notwithstanding the questionable assumptions that it has made,
existing research still provides important evidence on the questions of
whether civil litigants are getting justice and, if not, whether more
lawyers is the solution to the problem. If, for example, there was a
substantial difference between the justice that civil litigants obtained
when they had a lawyer versus when they did not, that would indicate
two important things: (1) that the civil legal system was producing
different outcomes among similarly situated litigants (suggesting that
some of those litigants were not getting the outcomes they were legally
entitled to), and (2) that providing them with lawyers is a likely
solution to that problem. But, unfortunately, the research that has been
done on access to justice provides confusing evidence on both of those
questions.
This research appears to reflect motivated reasoning. Rather than
reasoning from the evidence to a solution, it starts with the premise
that we need more free lawyers and then looks for the empirical
support. The evidence does indicate a potential problem with the legal
system, so it should not be ignored. And it may be true that the most
sensible investment in improving the system is the involvement of
more lawyers for unrepresented litigants. Lawyers can push the system
to pay more attention to the rule of law. But this orientation toward
using the evidence to justify spending more money on lawyers, rather
than looking at whether it makes sense to invest in improving the legal
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system in other ways, means that we are not necessarily looking at the
right problem or the right solution.

C. The Problems of Quantitative Analysis
In addition to a problem of being agenda-driven, existing empirical
scholarship concerned with our courts also appears to have a problem
of method. Almost no qualitative research is being done, and such
privilege is given to quantitative research that it is difficult to pose and
answer the kinds of questions about the rule of law that only qualitative
research can address.
Nearly all of the research that has been done on our legal system
has been quantitative in nature.74 That is, it looks at what can be
learned by using statistical methods and mathematical analysis. Such
quantitative research is the standard approach to empirical study in
many fields.75 And it is indeed apt as a means of demonstrating the
frequency of phenomena. For example, if it needs to be determined
how often a summary ejectment proceeding brought by a landlord
leads to the eviction of a tenant, or how often tenants are aware that
they have a legal cause of action against their landlords for failure to
make repairs of housing code violations, quantitative research is the
most appropriate method for determining the answer. It can also (in
theory) be used to test a hypothesis that is based on questions of
frequency, such as whether representation by a lawyer makes it more
74

75

See, e.g., Marilyn M. Mosier & Richard A. Soble, Modern Legislation,
Metropolitan Court, Miniscule Results: A Study of Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant
Court, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 8 (1973); Julian R. Birnbaum et al., Chicago’s
Eviction Court: A Tenants’ Court of No Resort, 17 URB. L. ANN. 93 (1979);
Barbara Bezdek, Silence in The Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor
Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992); Paula
Hannaford-Agor & Nicole Mott, Research on Self-Represented Litigation:
Preliminary Results and Methodological Considerations, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 163
(2003); Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor
Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized
Experiment, 35 L. AND SOC’Y REV. 419 (2001); Steven Gunn, Note, Eviction
Defense for Poor Tenants: Costly Compassion or Justice Served?, 13 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 385 (1995); Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 64, at 2118; Rebecca
L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 51 (2010); Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of
Justice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled Legal Services, 18 GEO.
J. POVERTY L & POL’Y 453 (2011); Summers, supra note 67.
ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 4, 10 (5th ed.
2014); Carl H. Coleman, Duties to Subjects in Clinical Research, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 387, 393 (2005).
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likely that a tenant will be able to avoid eviction than not receiving
such representation.
The problems with this focus on quantitative research can be
illustrated by some of the “best” access to justice research that has
been done. The most rigorous empirical legal scholarship on access to
justice has used the randomized controlled trial (“RCT”), which has
frequently been described as the “gold standard” of quantitative
research.76 In theory, RCT could be very helpful in demonstrating the
effect of lawyer representation. If the group of litigants receiving the
intervention of lawyer representation was substantially similar to the
control group that did not, and the only operating independent variable
was whether the litigants received representation by a lawyer, then a
statistically-significant difference in outcomes between the represented
and the unrepresented should isolate the impact of representation.
Moreover, if such a difference were demonstrated, that would also
provide support for two other hypotheses: that civil litigants are in fact
having trouble obtaining justice, and that lack of legal representation is
the reason why. Such findings would suggest a gap between the results
that litigants receive and the results they could achieve—and that
would indicate that the law was not being adequately enforced, at least
for the unrepresented litigants.
However, the findings of RCT research on lawyer representation
have been equivocal, telling us little about the degree to which civil
litigants are obtaining justice and whether lawyers increase the
likelihood that they will. The RCTs conducted by D. James Greiner,
Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, and Jonathan Hennessy found that
representation by a lawyer substantially improved the outcomes for
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Coleman, supra note 75 (“The ‘gold standard’ for clinical research is the
randomized controlled trial, in which one group of subjects is randomly assigned
to receive an investigational intervention while one or more other groups receive
either a different intervention or a placebo.”); Sarah Cotterill & Liz Richardson,
Expanding the Use of Experiments on Civic Behavior: Experiments with Local
Government as a Research Partner, 628 ANNALS AMERICAN ACAD. POL. AND
SOC. SCI. SERIES 148, 156 (2010) (“A randomized controlled trial is a gold
standard method for measuring whether or not a particular intervention works
better than doing something else or doing nothing.”); Nicholas Mader, The Big
Data Era and an Integrated Mode of Inquiry for Social Policy-Relevant
Research, 11 I/S J.L. AND POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 97, 101 (2015) (“For interval
validity in policy investigations, the gold standard is typically held to be the
randomized controlled trial (RCT), which is designed to isolate the impact of
one causal factor—the policy of interest—on one or more outcomes.”).
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civil litigants in a Massachusetts District Court. 77 But their similar
RCT in a Massachusetts Housing Court found that representation by a
lawyer did not improve outcomes.78
It is important to note that these studies did not compare
representation by a lawyer to no assistance at all. 79 The Massachusetts
District Court study compared those who received legal representation
to a control group that received self-help instruction and some
assistance with completing court forms.80 The Massachusetts Housing
Court study compared those who received legal representation to a
control group given limited non-courtroom assistance (legal advice)
from a lawyer.81 Thus, the benefit from lawyer representation when
compared to no assistance at all could be much greater. However,
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78

79
80
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Approximately two-thirds of treated-group occupants retained
possession of their housing units at the end of summary eviction
proceedings, as compared with about one-third of control group
occupants. In cases involving nonpayment of rent or serious
monetary counterclaims, the net financial effect of the litigation
was such that those in the treated group were not obligated to pay
an average net of 9.4 months of rent per case (relative to what the
evictor alleged to be due), while the corresponding figure for
control group occupants was 1.9 months of rent per case. Both
results were statistically significant, despite the small size of our
study (76 treated and 53 control cases).
D. James Greiner, Cassandra W. Pattanayak, & Jonathan Hennessy, The Limits
of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts
District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 908-09
(2013) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter District Court Study].
D. James Greiner, Cassandra W. Pattanayak, & Jonathan Hennessy, How
Effective Are Limited Legal Assistance Programs? A Randomized Experiment in
a Massachusetts Housing Court 5-6 (Sept. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the UMass Law Review) [hereinafter Housing Court Study] (the
research found “no statistically significant evidence that the Provider’s offer of a
traditional attorney-client relationship, as compared to a referral to the
Provider’s LFTD [lawyer for the day] program, had a large (or any) effect on the
likelihood that the occupant would retain possession; on the financial
consequences of the dispute; on the judicial involvement in or attention to
litigation cases; or on any other outcome.”)
District Court Study, supra note 77, at 978.
Id. at 908.
Housing Court Study, supra note 78, at 2 (“The unbundled assistance consisted
of court-hearing-day-only representation in hallway settlement negotiations and
mediation sessions (but not in court appearances or in filing motions) through a
lawyer for the day (‘LFTD’) program.”).

30

UMass Law Review

v. 17 | 2

high-quality research making that particular comparison has yet to be
done.
These existing studies did not provide meaningful evidence for any
particular hypothesis because they did not manage two important
factors: the variables of judge and lawyer behaviors. Both of these
potentially idiosyncratic features could have a large effect on
outcomes to the extent that they can obscure the impact of any
intervention. Moreover, due to the small number of lawyers and judges
that were involved in this research, any such impacts would be
enhanced. The relatively large sample of litigants in these studies can
reduce the impact of variations between and among litigants through
the buffering effect of numbers, but that is not going to be the case
where the number of judges and lawyers involved are in the low single
digits.
Lawyers may behave differently enough from each other to affect
results. The lawyers in the district court study, for example, filed more
pretrial motions and made demands for jury trials more often than the
lawyers did in the housing court study. 82 Indeed, the researchers
observed that the difference in results between the two studies might
have reflected the “facilitative, non-confrontational litigation style” of
the attorneys in the housing court study, as compared to the “assertive”
style of the lawyers in the district court study.83 The difference in
tactics, possibly leading to better outcomes, may mean better
enforcement of legal rights that occurred as the result of having a
(more aggressive) lawyer. However, the results may also reflect the
greater pressure that such aggressive lawyer behavior placed on
opposing parties, and on the court, to make concessions to the litigants
who had the greater leverage that these tactics created. In other words,
civil litigants may obtain an advantage from legal representation, but
the advantage may not be improved enforcement of the law. It may
instead represent the “gamesmanship” advantages that come from
vigorous, strategic lawyering. That is no insignificant benefit, but it is
a different one from better enforcement of the law, and may be less
worthwhile as a ground for reform than would be improved
enforcement of the law.84 In any event, variations in lawyer behavior
weakened the capacity of these studies to say anything definitive.
82
83
84

Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 47.
The benefit could be a “leveling of the playing field,” which would increase the
fairness of the system (to the extent that tenants were disproportionately

2021

Taking the Rule of Law Seriously

31

The impact of judicial behavior may also have skewed the results.
It might not seem as if variables associated with judging should have
much impact, insofar as judges all apply the same law. But we simply
cannot assume that they apply it in the same way at all times. The
researchers acknowledge that the single judge who heard most of the
cases in the district court study might have been “unusually receptive”
to the lawyers representing clients before that court, as he had worked
for the same legal services provider himself at one time.85 Judicial bias
can affect or obscure the impact of an intervention, and that may have
been the case in these studies.
The differences in outcomes that can result from differences in
lawyering and judging can greatly reduce the value of the RCT in this
situation, as compared to its other, more customary uses, such as drug
trials. In the typical RCT drug trial, one group receives the treatment
and the control group receives the placebo, and the subjects can be
expected to have whatever response they have, regardless of who
administers the treatment or the occasion upon which it is
administered.86 Or, at least, these factors do not have enough of an
effect to overwhelm the evidence of the drug’s efficacy. However, in
using RCT to assess the value of lawyer representation, it matters
which attorneys provide the representation and which judges preside
over the cases, because these variables can potentially affect the
outcomes. After these RCT studies of legal representation, we do not
know whether lawyer representation frequently, sometimes, or hardly
ever leads to better outcomes for civil litigants. The district court study
showing a significant effect for representation by a lawyer supports the
idea that legal representation can make a difference, but it does not tell
us whether the impact obtained is readily achievable, occasionally
achievable, or nearly impossible, or under what circumstances it might
be achieved.
This research on access to justice not only tells us little of value
about whether lawyer representation improves outcomes for civil
litigants, but it also tells us little of value about whether civil litigants
are generally getting, or not getting, justice in civil court, or what
would be the means for them to get justice if they are not. The focus of
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unrepresented). But it would not necessarily increase the justice of the decisionmaking.
District Court Study, supra note 77, at 947.
See Eduardo Hariton & Joseph J. Locascio, Randomised Controlled Trials—The
Gold Standard for Effectiveness Research, 125 BJOG 1716, 1716 (2018).
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legal scholarship on access to justice has shaped the research agenda
without much concern for the problem presented by its assumptions or
about the appropriateness of the quantitative research methods used to
answer the research question. In these RCT studies, a problematic
method was employed to try to answer a problematic research
question, leading to problematic results.
In other words, the quantitative approach currently emphasized for
empirical work on access to justice shows that this “gold standard” has
many shortcomings when applied in the context of our legal system.
The quantitative methods that are touted as best practices for empirical
study are being oversold, to the detriment of what can be learned from
such methods. For study of the rule of law, which is difficult to
examine other than by qualitative means, the emphasis on quantitative
research is discouraging, if not foreclosing, the necessary work.
III. THE WAY FORWARD: USING THE RULE OF LAW AS A METRIC
FOR EVALUATING THE LEGAL SYSTEM QUALITATIVELY (AS
WELL AS QUANTITATIVELY) AS A WAY OF TAKING THE RULE OF
LAW SERIOUSLY
A. The Case for Qualitative Study
Although quantitative research is not well-suited to studying many
questions about the legal system, the prevalence of such research
indicates that this incongruence is not well-appreciated.87 On the other
hand, the recognized shortcomings of qualitative research seems to
have been held against it, as suggested by the fact that very little
qualitative research has been done on the legal system.88
The paucity of qualitative research is concerning because it is
doubtful whether quantitative research is the best method for
answering all—or even the most important—questions about our legal
system, including how well we are implementing the rule of law. The
researchers behind the Massachusetts Housing and District Court
studies recognized as much when they pointed out that “[t]he
randomized control trial design tells researchers and policymakers
nothing about where some set of outcomes fits on an absolute scale
such as ‘sufficient to meet minimum due process standards’ versus
‘insufficient to meet due process standards.’”89 The question of due
87
88
89

Mader, supra note 76, at 101-02.
But see sources cited supra note 67.
District Court Study, supra note 77, at 957.
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process is closely related to the attainment of the rule of law, but it
would be more important to know whether the outcomes satisfy the
rule of law than whether they meet due process requirements. 90
Similarly, Paula Hannaford-Agor and Nicole Mott remark that the
“question of just outcomes may be the most important question of all”
in research on courts,91 but it goes largely unexplored. “Just outcomes”
should mean whether the norms as stated are the norms as applied.
Quantitative research is not well-suited to answering such “how”
or “why” questions about the legal system—in demonstrating how the
law is applied and why outcomes are reached. For example, even if a
quantitative study demonstrated that tenants with legal representation
were better able to avoid eviction than unrepresented tenants, it still
would not tell us why or how legal representation helped. Qualitative
research, by contrast, is uniquely suited to answer such questions. 92
Although qualitative research is an uncommon method of legal
scholarship, this does not detract from its importance in the social
sciences.93 For example, case studies have been recognized as making
important contributions to the empirical work of many fields,
including sociology, political science, anthropology, and business. 94 It
is somewhat ironic that case studies are rare in legal scholarship. In
general, legal education pays close attention to the “case method.” But
that interest in the analysis of illustrative examples has generally been
limited to the law school classroom.
The “new legal realists” have advocated for expanding the scope
and methods of empirical work in legal scholarship beyond statistical
90
91
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See discussion supra Part I.E.
Hannaford-Agor & Mott, supra note 74, at 178.
YIN, supra note 75, at 10 (“‘[H]ow’ and ‘why’ questions are more explanatory
and likely to lead to the use of a case study, history, or experiment as the
preferred research method.”).
Id. at 4.
Yin identifies that case studies are commonly used in “psychology, sociology,
political science, anthropology, social work, business, education, nursing, and
community planning.” Id. John Gerring remarks that
[t]he case study occupies a vexed position in the discipline of
political science. On the one hand, methodologists generally view
the case study method with extreme circumspection . . . . At the
same time, the discipline continues to produce a vast number of
case studies, many of which have entered the pantheon of classic
works.
John Gerring, What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?, 98 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 341, 341 (2004) (citation omitted).
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study. For example, Howard Erlanger et al., have argued that we ought
to be more concerned with “the impact of law on ordinary people’s
lives” and therefore should “include in our toolkit some of the social
science methods best suited for this task” including “the qualitative
methods developed by fields like anthropology and history for
examining everyday experience.”95 Similarly, Victoria Nourse and
Gregory Shaffer have called for “an empiricism that adopts
anthropological and sociological approaches, in which academics leave
their universities and investigate the world,” with the goal of studying
“the law in action,”96 to “take account of people’s lived experience of
the law in particular settings.”97 Indeed, such qualitative study would
better answer the most important questions about our legal system,
such as how litigants are faring and why they are not getting justice if
they are not.
Legal scholars may have shied away from qualitative research on
the theory that “whether the litigant received a just or appropriate
outcome” is “subjective,” and “one of the most difficult questions for
which to formulate accurate and reliable measures for empirical
analysis.”98 However, it is not clear that the qualitative research
necessary to address that question is particularly likely to be
“subjective” or to be more so than quantitative research. It is true that
data pertaining to frequency are presented objectively in the form of
numbers and that quantitative research methods limit the effects of
researcher bias. However, the analysis of results is always going to be
affected by the perspective of the researcher.99
Even with the supposed gold standard of the RCT in the legal
realm, some subjectivity creeps in. For example, in the RCT studies of
Greiner, Pattanayak, and Hennessy, the authors described the housing
court study’s absence of statistically significant difference in outcomes
as “good news” for limited assistance programs, insofar as their
“outcomes are essentially indistinguishable from those that would have
been achieved via a more expensive program offering full
95
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Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword: Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005
WIS. L. REV. 335, 340 (2005).
Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New
World Order Prompt a NewLegal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 79 (2009).
Erlanger et al., supra note 95, at 345.
Hannaford-Agor and Mott, supra note 74, at 178.
Philip E. Tetlock et al., Detecting and Punishing Unconscious Bias, 42 J. LEGAL
STUD. 83, 103 (2013).
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representation.”100 Similarly, Jeanne Charn interpreted this study as
“provid[ing] some rigorous evidence that self-representation can be
successful, at least in some settings, some of the time” which
“undercut[s] the civil Gideon premise that attorneys are essential to
good outcomes.”101 These interpretations of the data are subjective. It
could just as easily be true that limited assistance performed as badly
as legal representation. In other words, it is not evident that these
results are “good news” for any type of intervention. Researchers bring
a particular perspective to the analysis of the data, whatever may be
the objective nature of that data. Quantitative research does not
eliminate that aspect of subjectivity.
In addition, qualitative research can be done in ways that improve
its reliability and validity by increasing its generalizability and
reducing the risk of subjectivity.102 If such a method is the best means
to answer the most important questions, and such measures can be
taken, then qualitative research should play a much greater role in
legal scholarship. As some of the existing research suggests, legal
scholars have shied away from attempting to answer questions that
involve considerations relevant to the rule of law because they are not
easily quantifiable.
The weaknesses of quantitative research provide guidance for
thinking about what kind of research would be necessary to take the
rule of law seriously. It cannot simply be assumed, as much
quantitative research does, that other kinds of research are less useful
or not useful, or that the questions it fails to answer are unanswerable
because they require the use of judgment or provide the opportunity for
subjectivity. This attitude not only unreasonably disparages qualitative
research but ignores questions that require qualitative research to
answer, such as whether and to what extent the rule of law operates in
our courtrooms and what kinds of things interfere with its full
achievement.
B. The Relationship Between Qualitative and Quantitative
Study
Although quantitative analysis is less useful for evaluating the rule
of law, this does not mean that such research has no utility. It is, to
100
101

102

Housing Court study, supra note 78, at 40.
Jeanne Charn, Celebrating the “Null” Finding: Evidence-Based Strategies for
Improving Access to Legal Services, 122 YALE L.J. 2206, 2222 (2013).
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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some extent, possible to quantitatively assess whether a system has the
rule of law by identifying particular features as criteria and the
frequency with which they occur. For example, it might be said that it
is necessary to the rule of law that adjudicators communicate to
litigants the particular law that is being applied to their cases, 103 and a
quantitative analysis could be done of how often that communication
actually occurs. Or it might be said that the rule of law requires
limitations on the use of discretion,104 and frequent exercises of
discretion should be treated as evidence of a failing, and similarly
tabulated. But it would be difficult to know whether such a
quantitative approach has truly captured the nature and extent of any
problem with the vitality of the rule of law in the legal system, insofar
as it “pre-identifies” what is important to account for, rather than
making that determination based on comprehensive study.
Quantitative research can also provide important indirect evidence
about whether our system can be said to have the rule of law. The
RCT studies may not have achieved such a purpose, 105 but Nicole
Summers’ study of enforcement of the warranty of habitability in New
York City courts presents highly suggestive evidence that the norms as
stated are not the norms as applied.106 This New York study, which
analyzed a large representative sample of cases from that jurisdiction,
found that “more than 90 percent of tenants with meritorious claims
did not benefit from the warranty [of habitability] at all.” 107 That is,
tenants occupying residences with housing code violations that
technically made them eligible for rent abatements or mandated repairs
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This feature could be derived from Fuller’s precept that the law needs to be
public. See FULLER, supra note 20, at 39; Fallon, supra note 7, at 8 n.27.
Judge Posner has pointed out that the exercise of discretion is in tension with the
rule of law. He has remarked that “[a] system of untrammeled official discretion
would be inconsistent with the premises of the liberal state, prominent among
which is the rule of law—the concept of a ‘government of laws, not men.’”
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 61 (1990).
Accordingly, “[i]t is desirable to minimize the discretion of officials, including
judges.” Id. at 60.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
Summers, supra note 67, at 210.
Id. at 210. “Overall, less than [two] percent of tenants who had meritorious
claims received rent abatements. Perhaps even more astonishing, only [seven]
percent of tenants whose landlords have been cited by the City for hazardous or
immediately hazardous Housing Code violations—a subset of those who had
meritorious claims— received abatements.” Id. at 150-51.
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seldom actually received them.108 This evidence is circumstantial
rather than direct evidence that the norms as stated are not being
applied—though it is difficult to account for such results in any other
way.
The New York study did not focus on legal representation, though
of course it had to give the impact of legal representation some
consideration in light of the influence of the “access to justice”
movement. Summers found that while legal representation increased
the success rate of tenants, it did not have a substantial impact, and
lack of representation did not account for the majority of tenants’
failure rate.109 For example, most of the tenants who had legal
representation and documented housing code violations still did not
get any compensatory rent abatement.110
As quantitative research, the New York study was unable to say
why enforcement was so weak.111 It demonstrated that the law was not
producing the outcomes that would be expected—tenants whose units
had documented housing code violations seldom got the legallyspecified remedies—but failed to show why they were unable to do so,
or why there was such “a major operationalization gap.” 112
Summers’ analysis rejects certain possible explanations for why
tenants were largely unsuccessful, including the idea that they lacked
sufficient evidence to support their claims (the correlated housing code
violations undercut that theory) and the idea that the failure to obtain
justice was due to lack of counsel (even having counsel did little to
change outcomes).113 But the study reached—and can reach—few
conclusions about why this “major operationalization gap” was
occurring.114 For example, judges sometimes ordered landlords to
make repairs, but “landlords evaded compliance with the orders nearly
three-quarters of the time.”115 What does “evaded compliance” mean
here? Was there some problem with the order that was issued? With
108
109
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Id. at 210.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 151 (“The significant majority—at least 70 percent—of tenants who were
represented by counsel and had meritorious warranty of habitability claims still
did not receive a rent abatement.”).
See id. at 215.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 208-11.
See id. at 210-14.
Id. at 210.
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the enforcement of that order? With tenant persistence in the face of
noncompliance? With lawyer follow-up where lawyer representation
occurred? It is not possible to say.
Summers hints at the need for research that provides more
fundamental explanations, that examines “court culture or imbalances
of power.”116 And she notes anecdotally that tenants reported that their
problems had less to do with proof of their claims and more with the
fact that “judges did not want to entertain them.” 117 In addition,
Summers concludes that while the court does “function[ ] as a forum
to order landlords to perform needed repairs, the forum lacks
accountability.”118 These observations provide implications that could
be productively examined in qualitative research.
Her description of what happened as involving a “major
operationalization gap” is making a more modest claim than the claim
that this court is not respecting the rule of law in its decisionmaking.119 That more modest claim is appropriate, in that the research
could not identify the causes of the results, or even confirm with direct
evidence that they stem from the court’s widespread failure to apply
the norms as stated. But this “major operationalization gap” is strong
evidence that we need to study how and why what is happening is
happening.
Qualitative analysis is a means to that end. Such an approach
should make it easier to determine the circumstances under which the
norms as stated were (or were not) applied. It would provide a better
basis for determining not only the causes but also what interventions
could change outcomes (including possible measures to address any
failures to apply the norms as stated).120
Case study research is particularly appropriate to such
investigations, especially where it builds on existing quantitative study
(and gains further validity when it supports and is consistent with such
study).121 To determine how and why these failures occurred, the ideal
116
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Id. at 217.
Id.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 210 (“These findings strongly indicate that the warranty of habitability
suffers from a major operationalization gap.”).
See, e.g., Case Study on Access to Justice, supra note 67, at 63.
To the extent that case study is consistent with other kinds of research in the
same area, its findings are entitled to greater validity. Id. at 47. See also Judges,
supra note 67, at 58-62; Gerring, supra note 94, at 353 (the case study and other
methods of research are “interdependent, and this is as it should be.” Such other
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research would probably consist of a multiple case study based on an
appropriate sample of the cases, assessing whether the norms that were
applied were the norms as stated. If these cases were sufficient in
number, appropriately chosen to be representative, and randomly
selected rather than cherry-picked or otherwise skewed to reflect any
particular agenda, that should provide some degree of validity and
reliability for whatever results are reached. Using an appropriately
randomized and representative sample of cases could also allow for
some measure of frequency for the occurrence of a particular problem,
as could analytical generalization.122
Further, it would reduce the risk of subjectivity123 if evaluation of
whether the norms as stated were the norms as applied was limited to a
determination whether the decision-making leading to any given
outcome could be reasonably said to follow from the words of the law,
as opposed to not following in any discernable way from the words of
the law. Decision-making by courts cannot be described as violating
the norms as stated merely because it differs from how many or even
most people would interpret the stated norms. Only those decisions
that cannot be understood as faithful to the language of the law, under
such a deferential standard, should be seen as falling short of
adherence to the rule of law. The norms as stated must discernably be
the norms as applied. Taking such an approach to the analysis of the
cases would reduce the risk that the evaluation was based on the
researcher’s preferred reading of the law.
In addition, the determination of whether the norms as stated were
the norms being applied needs to be done competently. That is, it
needs to be made with subject matter knowledge, as opposed to
impressionistically or without specialized understanding. That ought
to go without saying, but it is nonetheless true that litigants’ perception
of fairness or justice is sometimes treated as a meaningful analysis.
Thus, some researchers have tried to assess the quality of justice
received though surveys in which litigants are quizzed about their
experience.124 Such research would not be revealing about whether the
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forms of research “may be desperately in need of in-depth studies focused on
single units.”).
Properly done case studies achieve analytic generalizability rather than
statistical generalizability. YIN, supra note 75, at 10.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See, e.g., GINA KUBITS ET AL., FOURTH JUD. DIST. STATE MINN., HOUSING
COURT FAIRNESS STUDY 8 (Oct. 2004), http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/4/
Public/Research/Housing_Court_Fairness_(2004).pdf.
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norms as stated are the norms as applied, given that most nonlawyers
are not well-situated to evaluate whether cases were determined in
accordance with law.
This sketch of appropriate qualitative study provides a way out of
our current cul-de-sac, where legal scholarship tends to be about
matters of little real-world importance, and what practical scholarship
exists tends to focus on “access to justice” without addressing the
more fundamental question of whether justice would be obtained even
if access was provided. Quantitative analysis is appealing in light of
our modern preoccupation with objective, data-driven evaluation, and
it no doubt has enormous value when put to the purposes that it is
suited for, as in the New York study.125 But qualitative research
remains the most useful means of answering some questions—
including the fundamental question about whether litigants can count
on receiving outcomes consistent with the rule of law—and we need to
accept and encourage such research in order to better answer such
important questions. Such a change in direction in legal scholarship
and in empirical research is necessary to take the rule of law seriously,
as something we intend to achieve and care about achieving.
CONCLUSION
The rule of law needs be taken seriously because it involves a
fundamental understanding of how our legal system should work.
Taking the rule of law seriously is, however, something that does not
happen much. In fact, we have actually made it difficult to determine
the extent to which the rule of law is operating effectively in our legal
system, because we have left the concept ill- defined and have avoided
the kinds of inquiry that could shed light on how well we are
implementing the rule of law.
However, we do have an understanding of the rule of law that
could work as a metric to help us determine whether we are in fact
living up to this cherished ideal. And we know the kind of study that
would illuminate whether we are entitled to claim that we have the rule
of law in this country, and to determine what needs to be done to make
it more effective. But to do that work, we must begin to take the rule of
law seriously.
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